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TURMOIL IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW 
By, Martin H. Malin 
Martin H. Malin is Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Law and the Workplace at IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law.  He teaches courses in labor law, public sector employment, employment 
law, employment discrimination, contracts and jurisprudence.  He has published seven books and more 
than 70 articles, including Public Sector Employment: Cases and Materials (2004, 2nd ed. 2011), the 
leading law school casebook on public sector labor law.  A seasoned arbitrator and mediator, Professor 
Malin is a former member of the Board of Governors of the National Academy of Arbitrators and a 
current member of the Board of Governors of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers.  He 
currently serves by appointment of President Obama as a Member of the Federal Service Impasses 
Panel.  This article is an expansion and update of his earlier article, The Legislative Upheaval in Public 
Sector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A.J. Lab. & Emp. L. 149 (2012). 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Illinois statutes governing public sector collective bargaining have been 
relatively stable in the second decade of the 21st century with SB 7 enacted in 2011 
marking the only significant amendment. Not so in many other states, which have 
seen significant changes to their laws since the 2010 elections. Major court 
challenges have been mounted to the changes in Arizona, Michigan and Wisconsin, 
and voters rejected the changes by referenda in Idaho in November 2012 and Ohio 
in November 2011. In Michigan, voters rejected by referendum in November 2012 
an emergency manager law that authorized abrogation of collective bargaining 
agreements during periods of fiscal distress only to see it reenacted by a lame duck 
legislature within a month after the election.  This article surveys the turmoil, 
grouping the changes by category of change. 
II. REPEAL OF THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
Two states, Oklahoma and Tennessee, repealed statutes that provided public 
employees with collective bargaining rights. On April 29, 2011, Oklahoma 
Governor Mary Fallin signed House Bill 1593 repealing the Oklahoma Municipal 
Employee Collective Bargaining Act, which had guaranteed the rights to organize 
and bargain collectively to employees of municipalities with populations above 
35,000.[1] The repeal leaves the decision to bargain to the municipalities’ 
discretion. The repeal’s sponsors argued that it was necessary to restore local 
control over the decision to bargain collectively.[2] The governor maintained that 
it would control costs.[3] 
 




Tennessee repealed the Education Professional Negotiations Act, which had 
provided teachers with the right to organize and bargain collectively since 1978, 
and replaced it with the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 
2011 (CCA).[4] The Tennessee Senate voted to repeal the collective bargaining law, 
but the state House of Representatives voted to limit the scope of bargaining rather 
than repeal it.[5] The following day, a conference committee voted for the repeal, 
which passed later that day in both houses.[6] 
Under the CCA, between October 1 and November 1, employees may file with the 
school district a petition for collaborative conferencing supported by a 15 percent 
showing of interest.[7] If this showing is met, the school board must appoint a 
committee with equal representation of board members and employees to conduct 
an election whereby employees vote whether to engage in collaborative 
conferencing and if so, who shall represent them. The choices for representation 
must include “unaffiliated” as an option.[8] If a majority votes for collaborative 
conferencing, the school board appoints a team of between seven and eleven 
management personnel. The employees are entitled to an equal number of 
representatives on the committee. Each employee representative option that 
received at least fifteen percent of the vote is entitled to proportional 
representation.[9] The committee that conducted the election selects the 
representatives of the unaffiliated employees, if 15 percent or more of the 
employees selected that option.[10] The collaborative conferencing committee 
remains in effect for three years, after which the election process is repeated.[11] 
The CCA defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by which [the parties] 
meet at reasonable times to confer, consult and discuss and to exchange 
information, opinions and proposals on matters relating to the terms and 
conditions of professional employee service, using the principles and techniques 
of interest-based collaborative problem-solving.”[12] The CCA prohibits refusing 
or failing to participate in collaborative conferencing.[13] It requires the parties 
jointly to prepare a written memorandum of understanding of any agreement 
reached, but conditions portions of an agreement requiring funding on the 
appropriation of such funding by the relevant authority.[14] Further, it expressly 
declares that the parties are not required to reach agreement; if no agreement is 
reached, the school board sets employee terms and conditions of employment by 
board policy.[15] The CCA also appears to authorize director of schools to bypass 
the employees’ representatives and deal directly with individual employees.[16] 
Beyond these provisions, the CCA is silent as to the content of the duty to engage 
in collaborative conferencing. Because Tennessee does not have a labor relations 
board to administer the CCA, it presumably will be up to the Tennessee courts to 
determine the content of the duty and the extent to which the generally well-
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defined duty to bargain will be applied to the duty to engage in collaborative 
conferencing. 
The Tennessee statute mandates collaborative conferencing with respect to 
salaries, grievance procedures, insurance, fringe benefits other than retirement 
benefits, working conditions, leave, and payroll deductions.[17] It expressly 
prohibits collaborative conferencing with respect to differential pay plans, 
incentive compensation, expenditure of grants or awards, evaluations, staffing 
decisions, personnel decisions concerning assignment of professional employees, 
and payroll deductions for political activities.[18] 
Several states, while not repealing their public employee collective bargaining 
statutes, amended them to deny collective bargaining rights to certain groups of 
employees. Nevada took bargaining rights away from doctors, lawyers, and some 
supervisors.[19] Had voters not rejected it, the Ohio enactment would have taken 
bargaining rights away from university faculty who participate in faculty 
governance and certain police and firefighter supervisors.[20] 
Wisconsin Act 10 took away collective bargaining rights from state university 
faculty, all employees of the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, and day 
care and home health care providers.[21] Although Act 10 did not repeal the 
Municipal Employee Relations Act or the State Employee Relations Act, it 
effectively abolished collective bargaining for all public employees except most law 
enforcement and fire protection personnel and municipal transit employees if 
denial of collective bargaining rights to those transit employees would result in the 
municipality losing federal funds.[22] It prohibits bargaining on any subject other 
than “base wages,” which expressly excludes overtime, premium pay, merit pay, 
performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay progressions.[23] Furthermore, base 
wages may not increase more than the increase in the consumer price index (CPI) 
as of 180 days before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.[24] In 
many respects, Oklahoma employees have more collective bargaining protection 
than Wisconsin employees. Although Oklahoma repealed its statute that mandated 
collective bargaining rights in mid-sized municipalities, it still allows collective 
bargaining at the option of the employer. In contrast, Wisconsin prohibits 
collective bargaining even if the employer is willing to engage in it.[25] It is not 
surprising that Wisconsin Act 10 repealed the declarations in the Municipal and 
State Employee Relations Acts that had found public employee collective 
bargaining to be in the public interest.[26] 
In Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC) v. Walker,[27] the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin upheld the 




constitutionality of the restricted scope of bargaining against attacks by a coalition 
of unions.  The unions argued that Act 10’s disparate treatment of most public 
employees, on the one hand, and security employees on the other, lacked a rational 
basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
distinguished between employees whose unions had supported Governor Scott 
Walker in the 2010 election and those who opposed him, in violation of the First 
Amendment.  The court reasoned that “political favoritism is no grounds for 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.”[28] Consequently, the 
court found that the disparate scope of bargaining survived rational basis 
scrutiny.[29] 
However, in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker,[30] the Circuit Court for Dane 
County held that Act 10’s restrictions on bargaining as applied to municipal 
employees violated the U.S. and Wisconsin constitutions.  The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals has affirmed the district court’s upholding of the disparate scope 
of bargaining while appeal of the Dane County Circuit Court decision is pending. 
III.  LIMITING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
By far, the most radical changes to the scope of bargaining occurred in Wisconsin, 
but Wisconsin was only one of several states to impose major limits on what may 
be negotiated.  Health care was the economic item most commonly removed from 
bargaining. 
In Wisconsin, although law enforcement and fire protection personnel were 
exempted from Act 10’s prohibition on bargaining for anything other than base 
wages, the state’s regular biannual budget act prohibited bargaining over law 
enforcement and firefighter health insurance.[31] Ohio’s enactment deemed “not 
appropriate” for bargaining, inter alia, health care benefits, except that the parties 
may agree that the employer will pay up to eighty-five percent of the 
premiums.[32] 
New Jersey suspended bargaining over health care benefits for four years while a 
new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding scale according to salary of 
mandatory employee contributions to health care premiums and provides for 
health care plans to be designed by two state committees, one for education and 
one for the rest of the public sector.[33] 
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to make changes in 
health insurance. The governing body may adopt changes in accordance with 
estimated cost savings and proof of the savings. It gives notice to each bargaining 
unit and a retiree representative. The retiree representative and the bargaining 
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unit representatives form a public employee committee that negotiates with the 
employer for up to thirty days. After thirty days, the matter is submitted to a tri-
partite committee, which, within ten days, can approve the employer’s proposed 
changes, reject them, or remand for additional information. The committee’s 
decision is final.[34] 
In its enactment subsequently rejected by voter referendum, Idaho limited 
negotiations for teachers to “compensation,” which it defined as salary and 
benefits, including insurance, leave time, and sick leave.[35] Voter rejection of the 
enactment restores the prior bargaining regime whereby bargaining subjects were 
determined by an agreement between the parties. The Idaho enactment also 
limited collective bargaining agreements to one fiscal year, July 1 through June 30, 
and prohibited evergreen clauses or other provisions that allow a contract to 
continue until a new one is reached.[36] 
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for teachers to wages and 
salary, and wage-related fringe benefits including insurance, retirement benefits, 
and paid time off.[37] The statute permits collective bargaining agreements to have 
grievance procedures, but deletes the prior law’s express authorization for a 
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.[38] The new statute 
prohibits bargaining on everything else, including express prohibitions on 
bargaining about the school calendar, teacher dismissal procedures and criteria, 
restructuring options, and contracting with an educational entity that provides 
post-secondary credits to students.[39] It also prohibits any contract that would 
place a school district in a budgetary deficit[40] and prohibits collective bargaining 
agreements from extending beyond the end of the state budget biennium.[41] The 
new law repeals a prior provision that authorized parties to agree to arbitrate 
teacher dismissals.[42] 
The Indiana enactment provides that the parties shall discuss: curriculum 
development and revision; textbook selection; teaching methods; hiring; 
evaluation; promotion; demotion; transfer; assignment; retention; student 
discipline, expulsion, or supervision of students; pupil/teacher ratio; class size or 
budget appropriations; safety issues; and hours.[43] However, any agreements 
reached in such discussions apparently may not be included in the contract. 
In addition to health care benefits, the Ohio enactment deemed the following 
inappropriate for collective bargaining: restricting contracting out or providing 
severance pay to employees whose jobs are contracted out; granting more than six 
weeks of vacation, more than twelve holidays, or more than three personal days; 
employer contributions to retirement systems; minimum staffing provisions, class 




size and restrictions on school district authority to assign personnel; reductions in 
force of educational employees; and seniority as the sole factor in reductions in 
force.[44] 
Michigan added to its list of prohibited subjects of bargaining for educational 
personnel. Decision and impact bargaining are now prohibited with respect to: 
placement of teachers; reductions in force and recalls; performance evaluation 
systems; the development, content, standards, procedures, adoption and 
implementation of a policy regarding employee discharge or discipline; the format, 
timing and number of classroom visits; the development, content, standards, 
procedures, adoption and implementation of the method of employee 
compensation; decisions about how an employee performance evaluation is used 
to determine performance-based compensation; and the development, format, 
content and procedures of notice to parents and legal guardians of pupils taught 
by a teacher who has been rated as ineffective.[45] 
IV. IMPASSE RESOLUTION 
Several jurisdictions made major changes to their impasse procedures, 
significantly increasing employer control over the final terms of employment. 
Wisconsin prohibited interest arbitration for all employees except law 
enforcement and firefighters.[46] Wisconsin now has no impasse procedures for 
most public employees. Of course, with bargaining limited to base wages, and 
further limited to changes in the CPI, there may not be much need for impasse 
resolution. 
Had it not been overturned by voters, Idaho would have repealed its requirement 
of factfinding.[47] Under the new Idaho enactment, the parties were authorized, 
but not required, to mediate if they had not reached agreement by May 10.[48] If 
they did not reach agreement by June 10, the school board was required to 
unilaterally set the terms and conditions of employment for the coming school year 
by June 22.[49] But for the November 2012 referendum, the Idaho enactment 
invited school districts to simply run out the clock in bargaining and then impose 
whatever terms they desired, as the statute did not expressly limit the unilateral 
terms to those that had been offered to the union. 
Since 1984, Ohio has recognized a right to strike for most public employees and a 
right to interest arbitration for the others. Ohio voters rejected the legislative 
enactment which would have prohibited strikes by all public employees and 
enforced the prohibition with fines for strikers of two days’ pay for each day on 
strike, discipline or discharge of strikers, loss of dues checkoff for striking unions, 
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and strike injunctions.[50] The Ohio enactment also would have prohibited 
interest arbitration. 
In place of strikes and interest arbitration, the Ohio enactment mandated 
factfinding if no agreement was reached forty-five days before scheduled 
expiration of an existing contract. The enactment required that the factfinder’s 
primary consideration be the public interest and welfare and the employer’s ability 
to pay. It limited the factfinder to considering the employer’s financial status as of 
the time period surrounding negotiations, precluding consideration of potential 
increases in employer revenue or employer ability to sell assets. The enactment 
allowed either party by majority vote within fifteen days following the factfinder’s 
recommendations to reject them. It required the Ohio State Employment Relations 
Board to publicize the rejected recommendations. Absent agreement within five 
days after publication, the parties were to submit their last best offers to the 
employer’s legislative body whose chief financial officer would certify which offer 
cost more and hold a public hearing. Within fifteen days following contract 
expiration, the legislative body was to pick one party’s final offer, with the 
employer’s offer governing if no selection were made.[51] 
New Jersey and Nevada made significant changes to their interest arbitration 
statutes. New Jersey amended its police and firefighter interest arbitration 
provisions to eliminate party selection of the arbitrator.[52] Now the Public 
Employment Relations Commission (PERC) randomly selects the arbitrator from 
a special panel.[53] Additionally, the parties must present written estimates of the 
financial impact of their final offers, and the award must be issued within forty-
five days of arbitrator appointment (prior law allowed 120 days).[54] The award 
must address all statutory criteria and certify that the arbitrator took statutory 
limitations imposed by the local levy cap into account.[55] The award may be 
appealed to PERC, which must: decide the appeal within thirty days; address all 
statutory factors; and certify that it took the levy cap into account.[56] The statute 
caps arbitrator fees at $1,000 per day and $7,500 total, and it caps cancellation 
fees at $500.[57] It also fines arbitrators $1,000 per day for being late.[58] 
Further, the arbitrator’s award may not increase base salary items by more than 
two percent of the aggregate amount expended by the employer in the twelve 
months immediately preceding expiration of the prior contract.[59] In addition, 
the arbitrator’s award may not include base salary items and other economic issues 
that were not included in the prior contract. The cap on base salaries sunsets on 
April 1, 2014.[60] 
In Nebraska, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) performs interest 
arbitration. The new Nebraska Act provides detailed criteria for selecting an array 




of comparable communities and specifies the number of comparable communities 
to be selected.[61] It mandates that if the employer pays compensation that is 
between 98 percent and 102 percent of the average of the comparables, including 
fringe benefits, the CIR must leave compensation unchanged.[62] If the employer’s 
compensation is below 98 percent of the average, the CIR is to raise it to 98 
percent, and if it is above 102 percent, the CIR is to lower it to 102 percent.[63] The 
targets are reduced to 95–100 percent during periods of recession, defined as two 
consecutive quarters in which the state’s net sales, use taxes, and individual and 
corporate income tax receipts are below those of the prior year.[64] 
Michigan amended its police and firefighter interest arbitration statute to provide 
for final offer issue-by-issue arbitration on economic issues, with traditional 
arbitration on other issues.[65] The Michigan enactment requires that the 
arbitrator to make the employer’s financial ability to pay the primary factor in 
deciding the award.[66] 
Indiana amended its teacher bargaining impasse procedures in a manner that is 
highly confusing. The new Indiana statute provides that if impasse is declared after 
at least sixty days of bargaining, the Indiana Educational Employment Relations 
Board (IEERB) is to appoint a mediator to conduct not more than three mediation 
sessions.[67] The mediation sessions must result in either an agreement between 
the parties or each party’s last best offer and the fiscal rationale behind the 
offer.[68] If there is no agreement fifteen days after mediation has ended, the 
parties proceed to factfinding.[69] One section of the statute states that factfinding 
must culminate in the factfinder imposing terms,[70] but another section states 
that the factfinder is to issue a report and recommendations to the IEERB, which 
is then allowed to add to the recommendations.[71] This apparent inconsistency 
calls out for IEERB clarification. 
V. FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
Three states addressed governments experiencing financial distress. Nevada 
required contracts to provide for reopening in times of fiscal emergency.[72] The 
voter-rejected Ohio enactment provided for modification or termination of 
contracts if the state placed a local government on fiscal watch or fiscal 
emergency.[73] 
The most far-reaching enactment and the greatest turmoil occurred in Michigan. 
The Michigan Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act of 
2011[74] specified procedures that could lead to a finding by the state of financial 
emergency. Upon such a finding, the governor appoints an emergency manager 
who, among other things, has the power to reject all or part of a contract upon 
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finding that: the financial emergency has created a circumstance making it 
reasonable and necessary for the state to intervene; the rejection is reasonable and 
necessary to deal with a broad, generalized economic problem; rejection is directly 
related to and designed to address the financial emergency; and rejection is 
temporary and does not target specific classes of employees.[75] 
In the November 2012 elections, Michigan voters rejected the enactment in a 
referendum.[76] However, in December, the lame duck legislature enacted a new 
emergency manager law which reestablished the emergency manager’s authority 
to abrogate contracts, including collective bargaining agreements.[77] 
VI.  INCREASED TRANSPARENCY 
Three state enactments, two of which were rejected in voter referenda, opened the 
collective bargaining process to increased public observation.  Under the Indiana 
statute, any party may inform the public of the status of collective bargaining as it 
progresses by release of factual information and expression of opinion based upon 
factual information.  Any mediation report filed at the conclusion of mediation is 
open to public inspection.  Factfinding hearings are open to the public and 
factfinding reports are open to public inspection.[78] 
The Idaho enactment rejected by referendum would have required all negotiation 
sessions and all ratification meetings to take place in open meetings and all 
documents exchanged in bargaining to be public documents.[79] The Ohio 
enactment rejected by referendum required factfinding hearings to be open to the 
public at the request of either party and the parties’ offers were to be posted on the 
Ohio State Employment Relations Board’s or the employer’s website.[80] It 
further provided that if the chief financial officer of a unit of local government 
determined that the final offer selected cost more than the final offer rejected, 
either party or a constituent supported by a petition signed by at least 5 percent of 
the electors who voted in the last gubernatorial election or 100 electors could force 
the matter to a referendum.[81] 
VII.  UNION FINANCES 
Many of the recent enactments have attacked union finances and many of those 
have been attacked in the courts.  Legislatures have taken steps to preclude unions 
from assessing agency shop or fair share fees against employees in the bargaining 
unit they represent who choose not to join the union.  Legislatures have also taken 
steps to make it more difficult for unions to collect dues from those employees who 
voluntarily choose to join, by prohibiting employers from agreeing to dues check-
offs or restricting such arrangements. 




In 2012, amid much controversy, Indiana enacted a “right to work” law which 
prohibited union security agreements in the private sector.[82] A year earlier, 
amid much less controversy, Indiana prohibited such agreements in public 
education.[83] Similarly, Wisconsin prohibited agency shop or fair share fee 
agreements for all public employees except exempted public safety personnel.[84] 
The Dane County Circuit Court has enjoined the Wisconsin prohibition on fair 
share fee agreements as applied to municipal employees, holding it violated the 
U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions.[85] 
Following the November 2012 elections, the Michigan legislature enacted two right 
to work statutes, one governing the private sector,[86] and one governing the 
public sector.[87] The latter exempts police, firefighters and state troopers.[88] 
The differential treatment of public safety workers and other public employees 
may lead to a constitutional challenge to the statute.  As discussed below, a 
Michigan enactment prohibiting dues check-off but only for teachers has been 
enjoined as unconstitutional. 
Wisconsin Act 10 prohibits dues check-off for all employees except public safety 
personnel.  In WEAC v. Walker,[89] a United States district court enjoined the 
prohibition as unconstitutional.  Public safety employees were defined in Act 10 as 
police officers, firefighters, deputy sheriffs, county traffic police officers, village 
police officers and firefighters, state troopers, and state motor vehicle inspectors.  
The record reflected that the unions who represented the Milwaukee police and 
firefighters, the West Allis Professional Police Association, the Wisconsin Sheriffs 
and Deputy Sheriffs Association and the Wisconsin Troopers Association 
(representing troopers and motor vehicle inspectors) all had endorsed Scott 
Walker for governor in the 2010 campaign.  In contrast, the unions representing 
other law enforcement and fire service employees, such as the Wisconsin Capitol 
Police, the University of Wisconsin Campus Police, state correctional officers, 
probation and parole officers, conservation wardens, fire crash rescue specialists, 
and state criminal investigation agents and the unions representing most other 
public employees in the state endorsed Governor Walker’s opponent.[90] In other 
words, Act 10 essentially prohibited dues check-off in bargaining units whose 
employees were represented by unions that had opposed Governor Walker’s 
election and allowed it in bargaining units whose employees were represented by 
unions that had supported the governor. 
The court found that Act 10’s distinction between general and public safety 
employees for purposes of allowing or prohibiting dues check-off lacked any 
rational basis and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.[91] The court also found that it violated the First 
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Amendment. The court distinguished Ysursa v. Pocatello Education 
Association,[92] where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Idaho’s 
prohibition on any check-off of monies to be used for political purposes on the 
ground that the Wisconsin enactment did not apply across the board but instead 
discriminated on the basis of speaker viewpoint. 
The fact that none of the public employee unions falling into the general category 
endorsed Walker in the 2010 election and that all of the unions that endorsed Walker fall 
within the public safety category certainly suggests that unions representing general 
employees have different viewpoints than those of the unions representing public safety 
employees. Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidence of record strongly 
suggests that the exemption of those unions from Act 10′s prohibition on automatic dues 
deductions enhances the ability of unions representing public safety employees to 
continue to support this Governor and his party.[93] 
By a two-one vote, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.  The 
majority characterized dues check-off as a government subsidy of speech and held 
that the government may discriminate in deciding what speech to subsidize.  The 
court also reasoned that the unions had failed to prove viewpoint discrimination 
because some of the employees exempted as public safety employees from Act 10 
had endorsed Governor Walker’s opponent.[94] 
Similarly, in United Food and Commercial Workers v. Brewer,[95] the court issued 
a preliminary injunction against the Protect Arizona Employees’ Paychecks from 
Politics Act, which required unions whose members paid their dues by payroll 
deduction to certify that they did not use dues for political purposes or to specify 
the percentage of dues that they would use for political purposes.  Payroll 
deduction of the percentage specified was prohibited unless the individual 
employee affirmatively consented to such deduction on an annual basis. [96] These 
restrictions did not apply to unions representing public safety employees or to 
other groups who received money by payroll deduction, such as retirement plan 
administrators, charitable organizations and insurance companies.[97] The court 
issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff unions were likely to 
succeed on the merits because the act unconstitutionally discriminated based on 
speaker viewpoint.[98] 
Michigan prohibited dues check-off for teachers.[99] The U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined the prohibition, finding it to 
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of ideological viewpoint.[100] 




  The Turmoil in Perspective 
The second decade of the 21st century continues what appears to be shaping up as 
a three-decade long pattern of sharp swings in public sector labor legislation.  The 
1990s were characterized by considerable backlash against public employee 
collective bargaining, particularly in public education. In 1994, Michigan, where 
John Engler was twice elected governor in part by demonizing the Michigan 
Education Association, prohibited bargaining on: the identity of a school district’s 
group insurance carrier; the starting day of the school term; the amount of 
required pupil contact time; and several other matters impacting employee 
working conditions.[101] Michigan also greatly strengthened its prohibition of 
public employee strikes.[102] Oregon amended its public employee collective 
bargaining statute to exclude from mandatory bargaining such subjects as class 
size, the school calendar, and teacher evaluation criteria.[103] 
In 1993, Wisconsin enacted the qualified economic offer (QEO), which essentially 
preempted bargaining over school employee wages as long as the school district’s 
wage offer met a prescribed formula.[104] Ohio prohibited bargaining on state 
university faculty workloads.[105] 
The Chicago School Reform Act of 1995 prohibited decision and impact bargaining 
in the Chicago Public Schools and the City Colleges of Chicago on numerous 
matters that had previously been negotiated, including: subcontracting; layoffs 
and reductions in force; and class size, staffing, and assignment.[106] 
Pennsylvania adopted Act 46 in 1998, which provided that whenever the 
Philadelphia school system was found to be in financial distress, it would not be 
required to bargain over, among other matters, subcontracting, reductions in 
force, the school calendar, and teacher preparation time.[107] The entire New 
Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations Act sunset in 1999 when a Republican 
governor vetoed its extension.[108] 
The first decade of the new century saw the pendulum swing in the opposite 
direction.  Illinois amended the Chicago School Reform Act to change the 
prohibited subjects of bargaining to permissive subjects.[109] Illinois also imposed 
first-contract interest arbitration for bargaining units of thirty-five or fewer 
employees.[110] Wisconsin repealed the QEO, granted collective bargaining rights 
to state university faculty and research assistants, made teacher preparation time 
and changes to teacher evaluation plans mandatory subjects of bargaining, and 
mandated that grievance arbitration continue during contract hiatus periods.[111] 
Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, New Hampshire, California, and Massachusetts 
mandated “card check” recognition.[112] Numerous states extended collective 
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bargaining rights to home health care aides and in-home daycare providers by 
designating the state as employer of record for collective bargaining purposes; 
otherwise, they would be considered independent contractors.[113] In 2003, New 
Mexico enacted a public employee collective bargaining statute that was stronger 
than the one that had sunset four years earlier.[114] In 2004, Oklahoma extended 
collective bargaining rights to employees of municipalities with populations of 
35,000 or more.[115] But the pendulum reversed directions again following the 
2010 elections. 
Radical shifts in state policies toward public employee collective bargaining may 
simply be a sign of the times.  A major political development has been a shift to 
single party dominance of state governments.  If major change is, in part, a result 
of the erosion of the restraint posed where different parties control majorities in 
state houses and governorships, we may see a continuation of the trend of major 
shifts of the pendulum.  After the 2012 elections, at least 37 states will have the 
same political party in control of both houses of the state legislature and the 
governorship.[116] 
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[4] Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. No. 378 (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-5-601 (2011)). 
[5] See Richard Locker, Teacher Bargaining Hinges on GOP, MEMPHIS COM. 
APPEAL, May 20, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/publishing/aba_journal_labor_employment_law/jlel_v27n2.authche
ckdam.pdf. 




[6] See Richard Locker, Teachers Rights to Negotiate Repealed—Late House Vote 
Kills Collective Bargaining by Teachers, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 21, 2011, at 
A1, available at 2011 WLNR 10275968. Critics of the repeal charged that it was 
Republican retaliation against the Tennessee Education Association for supporting 
more Democrats than Republicans in the 2010 elections, noting that 
Representative Glen Casada, chair of the Republican caucus, had asked the union 
prior to the elections to increase its campaign contributions to Republicans to 
equal what it was giving to Democrats. Locker, supra note 38. 
[7] Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. No. 378 (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(1) 
(2011)). 
[8] Id. § 49-5-605(b)(1), (2). 
[9] Id. § 49-5-605(b)(4). 
[10] Id. § 49-5-605(b)(5). 
[11] Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A). 
[12] Id. § 49-5-602(2). 
[13] Id. § 49-5-606(a)(3), (b)(2). 
[14] Id. § 49-5-609(b). 
[15] Id. § 49-5-609(d). 
[16] See id. § 49-5-608(c). 
[17] Id. § 49-5-608(a). 
[18] Id. § 49-5-608(b). 
[19] S.B. 98, §§ 5, 6, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140 
(2011)). 
[20] S.B. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
4117.01(K); (C)(10); (F)(2). 
[21] 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265 (state university faculty); 279 (U.W. Hospitals and 
Clinics), 280 (day and home health care providers). 
 WINTER 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 17 
      
[22] While Act 10 permits “public safety officers” to bargain collectively, its 
definition of “public safety officer” excludes certain law enforcement officers. For 
example, under Act 10, officers employed by the Wisconsin State Capitol Police 
and University of Wisconsin–Madison Police Department are not considered 
public safety officers, making them subject to Act 10. See State Agents, DNR 
Wardens Not Exempt From Walker Cuts, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116502363.html (noting distinction 
between certain classes of law enforcement officers). 
[23] 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 314 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 111.91(3). 
[24] Id. 
[25] Id. § 169(1m) (codified at WIS. STAT. § 111.66.0508). 
[26] Id. § 261. 
[27] 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part, 
194 LRRM 3110 (7th Cir. 2013). 
[28] Id. at 868. 
[29] Id. 
[30] No. 11-CV-3774 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County Sept. 14, 2012), appeal filed, (Wis. 
Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012). 
[31] 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409cy (codified at WIS. STAT. § 111.70(4)(mc)5. 
[32] S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4117.08(B)(2), (E). 
[33] 2011 N.J. Laws ch. 78. 
[34] 2011 Mass. Acts, ch. 69. Media reports suggested that in April when the 
Massachusetts House passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama’s 
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs telephoned Massachusetts Governor Deval 
Patrick with concerns about the bill, which had been strongly opposed by 
organized labor. The governor negotiated changes with labor leaders whose 
attitude changed from a vow to fight the legislation “to the bitter end” to support 
and congratulations to the governor for “listening to labor’s concerns.” See Michael 
Levenson, National Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law, BOS. GLOBE, July 12, 2011, 
available at 2011 WLNR 13742434. 




[35] S.B. 1108 § 17, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011); see Emilie Ritter Saunders, Map: Voters 
Overturn Luna’s Education Laws, Reject Propositions 1, 2, And 3, STATE IMPACT 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 4:04 PM), http://statimpact.npr.org/idaho/maps/map-voters-over 
turn-lunas-education-laws-reject-prepositions-1-2-and-3/. 
[36] S.B. 1108 § 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011). 
[37] Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 14, 117th Gen. Assem. (Ind. 2011) (codified at 
Ind. Code Ann. § 20-29-6). 
[38] Id. § 17. 
[39] Id. § 15. 
[40] Id. § 13. 
[41] Id. § 16. 
[42] Id. § 6. 
[43] Id. § 18. 
[44] S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
4117.08(B)(4) (contracting out); 4117.105(B) (severance pay to employees whose 
jobs have been contracted out); 4117.108(A)(1) (vacation); 4117.108(A)(2)–(3) 
(holiday and personal time); 4117.08(B)(3) (employer contribution to the public 
employees retirement system); 4117.08(B)(5) (staffing); 4117.081(B)(1) (school 
district authority to assign); 4117.081(B)(3) (class size); 4117.081(B)(4) (RIF-
educational employees); 306.04(B) (seniority-transit); 709.012 (seniority-
firefighters); 3316.07(A)(11) (seniority-nonteaching school employees). 
[45] 2011 Mich. Pub. Act 103 (codified at MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 432.215(3)(j)-(p). 
[46] 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 233. 
[47] S.B. 1108 § 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011). 
[48] Id. § 20. 
[49] Id. 
[50] S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN § 
4117.12(B)(4).  See Ohio Sec’y of State, State Issue 2: November 8, 2011 (2011), 
 WINTER 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 19 
      
available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Research/electResults 
Main/2011results/20111108Issue2.aspx (reporting referendum results). 
[51] S.B. 5, 129th  Gen. Assemb.  (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN § § 
4117.14(D)(2). 
[52] 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 105, sec. 1, Pub. L. 1977, c. 85, § 3(e)(1) 
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13-A-16 (West 2010)). 
[53] Id. 
[54] Id. at sec. 1, § 3(f)(5). 
[55] Id. 
[56] Id. at sec. 1, § 3(f)(5)(a). 
[57] Id. at sec. 1, § 3(f)(6). 
[58] Id. at sec. 1, § 3(e)(4). 
[59] Id. at sec. 2(b) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16.7 (West 2010)). 
[60] Id. at sec. 4 (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16.9 (West 2010)). 
[61] L.B. 397, 102d Leg., 1st Sess., sec. 10 (Neb. 2011) (amending NEB. REV. STAT. 




[65] Act effective July 20, 2011, 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 116, sec. 8 (amending MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 423.238 (2011)). 
[66] Id. at sec. 9 (amending MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 423.239 (2011)). 
[67] S.B. 575, 117th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1.22 (Ind. 2011) (amending 
IND. CODE § 20-29-6-13 (2011)). 
[68] Id. 
[69] Id. at sec. 1.23 (amending IND. CODE § 20-29-6-15 (2011)). 





[71] Id. at sec. 1.28 (amending IND. CODE § 20-29-8-7 (2011)). 
[72] S.B. 98, § 7(2)(w), 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011). 
[73] S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4117.104(A). 
[74] 2011 Mich. Pub. Act. No. 4. 
[75] Id. 
[76] See Nancy Kaffer, Voters Reject Attacks on Constitution, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Nov. 7, 2012, at 1. 
[77] 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 436; see Chad Livengood & Shawn D, Lewis, New EM 
Law Could Be Used to Appoint a Financial Czar in Detroit, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 
28, 2012, at http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20121221/Politics02/212280 
373/New-em-law-could-used-appoint-financial-czar-Detroit?. 
[78] Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 § 1, 117th Gen. Assem. (Ind. 2011). 
[79] S.B. 1108 § 15, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011). 
[80] S.B. 5, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4117.14. 
[81] Id. amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.141. 
[82] H. Enrolled Act No. 1001, 117th Gen. Assembly (Ind. 2012). 
[83] Prior to the 2011 enactment, the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a 
collective bargaining agreement provision obligating teachers who were not 
members of the union to pay the union a fair share fee, as long as failure to pay was 
not grounds for the nonpayer’s dismissal.  Ft. Wayne Educ. Ass’n v. Goetz, 443 
N.E.2d 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).  The 2011 enactment prohibited bargaining over 
all subjects, presumably including union security, except for wages and wage-
related fringe benefits.  See supra note 37-43 and accompanying text.  Indiana has 
no statute conferring collective bargaining rights on public employees outside of 
public education but municipalities may confer such rights on their employees.  
See AFSCME v. City of Gary, 578 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  In 1990, Indiana 
Governor Evan Bayh issued an executive order conferring collective bargaining 
 WINTER 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 21 
      
rights on state employees.  Exec. Order 90-6 (Ind. 1990).  Although Governor 
Mitch Daniels, on his first full day in office in 2005 revoked the executive order, 
thereby eliminating collective bargaining for state employees, see Steven 
Greenhouse, In Indiana, Clues to Future of Wisconsin Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2011, the Indiana Court of Appeals held lawful a fair share fee provision of a 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated under the Bayh executive order.  Byrd 
v. AFSCME, 781 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  By analogy to Byrd, with the 
absence of any statutory prohibition, it is arguable that union security provisions 
in municipal collective bargaining agreements remain lawful in Indiana. 
[84] 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 219, 276. 
[85] Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11-CV-3774 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County 
Sept. 14, 2012), appeal filed, (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012). 
[86] 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 348. 
[87] 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 349. 
[88] Id. §§ 14(4)(a)(i), (ii). 
[89] 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in relevant part, 
104 LRRM 3110 (7th Cir. 2013). 
[90] Id. at 864-65. 
[91] Id. at 876. 
[92] 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
[93] WEAC, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 873.  The court also quoted Wisconsin State Senate 
Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerld’s comments that Act 10 would deny funds to 
President Obama’s reelection campaign.  Id. at 875 n.17. 
[94] Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n v. Walker, 104 LRRM 3110 (7th Cir. 2013). 
[95] 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
[96] Id. at 1121-22. 
[97] Id. 
[98] Id. at 1124-27. 




[99] 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 53 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210 
(West 2011). 
[100] Bailey v. Callaghan, 873 F. Supp. 2d 879 (E.D. Mich. 2012), stay denied, 2012 
WL 3134338 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2012). 
[101] 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 446 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.215 
(West 2011)). 
[102] Id. (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.202 (West 2011)). 
[103] 1995 Or. Laws 286 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(e) (West 
2011)). 
[104] 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 26 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(1)(nc)). In 
2009, Wisconsin repealed the QEO in 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179 The text of the Act 
is available at: https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf. 
[105] 1993 Ohio Laws 3341 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.45 (West 
2011)); see Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124 (1999) 
(upholding constitutionality of the prohibition). 
[106] 1995 Ill. Laws 440, § 10, 516-518 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 
(West 2011)). 
[107] See David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the 
Schoolhouse: How Legislatures and Courts Shaped Labor Relations for Public 
Education Employees During the Last Decade, 30 J. L. & EDUC. 275, 295 (2001). 
[108] See Michael Coleman, Union Suit Against Gov. Rejected, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
July 1, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WLNR 2354044. 
[109] 2003 Ill. Laws 18, § 10, 38-41 (codified at 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4.5 
(West 2011)). This change became effective April 16, 2003. 
[110] 2009 Ill. Laws 5800 (codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/7) (West 2011). 
[111] 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179 The text of the Act is available at: https:// 
docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf. 
[112] 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/9(a-5) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-
5.1 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.682 (West 2011); S.B. 216, 160th Sess. 
 WINTER 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 23 
      
(N.H. 2007) (enacted), repealed by S.B. 589, 162d Sess. (N.H. 2011); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 71636.3 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150A, §§ 2, 5 (West 2011). 
[113] See generally Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work 
in State Labor Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390 (2008). 
[114] 2003 N.M. Laws 38 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-1 to -26 (West 
2011)). 
[115] 2004 Okla. Sess. Laws 330 (codified at OKLA. STAT. §§ 51-200 to 51-220 (West 
2011)). Oklahoma repealed these rights in 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 395. 
[116] See Monica Davey, One Party Control Opens States to Partisan Rush, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, at A-1. 
  





By, Student Editorial Board 
Alec Hausermann, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes and the National Labor Relations 
Act. 
I.  IERLA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Arbitration 
In Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 v IELRB, 2013 IL 113721 
(Ill. 2013) the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and 
confirmed the IELRB’s ruling that an arbitrator who determined that a written 
notice provision within a collective-bargaining agreement was not satisfied when 
Griggsville-Perry Community Unit School District No. 4 only gave vague warnings 
drew this determination from the essence of the collective-bargaining agreement. 
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed the IELRB’s ruling that the 
arbitrator’s interpretation drew from the essence of the collective-bargaining 
agreement when the arbitrator found that the employee was not at-will based on 
the language of the collective-bargaining agreement and the parties’ bargaining 
history, despite the absence of any language in the agreement specifically stating 
the employee was not at-will. 
In March 2008, a paraprofessional who was employed at an elementary school 
within the District was dismissed because she did not “relate well” to students and 
was “not always pleasant.” This was communicated to the employee with a written 
letter that informed her of her dismissal and included an offer that the employee 
could respond to the deficiencies at a school board meeting. For approximately a 
year prior to the dismissal, the principal of the school in which the employee 
worked had several conversations with the employee concerning the employee’s 
demeanor at work. These conversations were documented within a notebook. In 
addition to the conversations, the principal documented two incidents in which 
complaints were made against the employee concerning her attitude when 
interacting with children. The employee was never informed of either of these 
complaints nor were there investigations. 
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Prior to the school board meeting, the union representing the employee filled a 
grievance that focused mainly on the lack of specificity in the reasons for discharge, 
the lack of notice given to the employee concerning her poor performance, and the 
lack of opportunity for the employee to adequately respond to the negativity 
concerning her performance. The District denied the grievance and continued on 
to discharge the employee at the school board meeting after she was given an 
opportunity to speak. 
After the discharge, the matter moved to arbitration. The arbitrator determined 
that the collective-bargaining agreement required the District to give the employee 
and fair hearing, and that the District failed to do that when it decided to dismiss 
the employee prior to informing her of issues concerning her job performance and 
making the decision to dismiss the employee prior to giving her an opportunity to 
speak at the school board meeting. The District refused to adhere to the arbitrator’s 
award, and the employee’s union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the 
District. The IELRB confirmed the arbitrator’s award once amended to comply 
with a prior court decision. The District appealed and the appellate court reversed 
the IELRB ruling, finding that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the written notice 
provision was deficient and erroneous and that the employee was in fact at-will. 
Both parties filed petitions for leave to appeal. Both petitions were granted and 
then consolidated. 
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court erred in determining the 
correctness of the arbitrator’s interpretation of the written notice provision within 
the collective-bargaining agreement. The only question for a court is whether the 
arbitrator’s interpretation drew its essence from the collective-bargaining 
agreement. The supreme court found the arbitrator’s interpretation that a vague 
written notice violated a written notice provision because the ambiguity gave no 
way for the employee to properly prepare and defend herself in front of the school 
board, which was the purpose of giving written notice, was clearly within the 
essence of the collective-bargaining agreement. 
The district also argued, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed, that even if the 
written notice provision was violated, the violation did not matter because the 
employee was at-will. The district pointed to evidence that during the negotiations 
over the collective-bargaining agreement both sides presented proposals 
concerning dismissal reasons, but neither was adopted and the final agreement 
was silent on the issue. The arbitrator disagreed with the district’s assertion and 
again pointed the written notice provision, which would have served no purpose if 
employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement were at-will. Though, 
this did not mean that the employee could only be dismissed for just cause either, 




since it was expressly discussed and not adopted. Rather, the arbitrator applied a 
standard of arbitrariness to the district’s decision. Under this standard the 
arbitrator found that the districts’ decision to dismiss was arbitrary due to the 
conclusory conclusions made by the district, the lack of investigation into 
complaints, and that the burden essentially rested on the employee to refute the 
characterizations. 
The supreme court found that the arbitrator’s interpretation in the matter was 
drawn from the essence of the collective-bargaining agreement. It also found that 
the arbitrator’s interpretation had “ample support in case law.” The appellate court 
pointed to Bd. of Education of Harrisburg Community School Dist. No. 3 v. 
IELRB 227 Ill.App.3d 208, 591 N.E.2d 85 (1992) to show that the arbitrator’s 
ruling was incorrect. In Harrisburg an appellate court determined that an 
arbitrator was precluded from incorporating a just-cause standard into a 
collective-bargaining agreement where one was discussed during negotiations but 
not implemented. The supreme court agreed with the Harrisburg decision, but 
pointed out that the decision did not preclude the arbitrator from finding some 
standard of dismissal within the collective-bargaining agreement. Therefore, the 
supreme court found the arbitrator’s interpretation of a standard of arbitrariness 
consistent with the Harrisburg decision and was an acceptable interpretation. 
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an arbitrator’s interpretation drew its 
essence from the collective-bargaining agreement when the arbitrator determined 
that a written notice provision within a collective-bargaining agreement did not 
allow for ambiguity. In addition, the supreme court allowed for an arbitrator’s 
interpretation that a collective-bargaining agreement can contain some standard 
of dismissal even when for-cause was discussed in negotiation and not adopted. 
In Chicago Teachers Union and Chicago Board of Education, Case No. 2011-CA-
0091-C (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that the Chicago Board of Education 
violated Section 14(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to arbitrate the union’s grievances 
dealing with the employer’s reclassification of certain probationary teachers as 
ineligible for rehire. 
The events giving rise to the union’s grievances began in June 2010, when the 
employer informed the union that it was instituting a new policy where it would 
rate as ineligible for rehire non-renewal probationary appointed teachers who had 
been rated unsatisfactory or non-renewed more than once. The employer began 
implementing this policy at the end of the 2009-2010 school year. Between 
January and March 2011 the union demanded arbitration on behalf of a handful 
union members affected by the new policy. The employer refused to arbitrate the 
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grievances, stating that the subject matter was inherently a management decision 
and, as a consequence, was not arbitrable under the collective bargaining 
agreement. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
IELRB alleging that the Employer violated section 14(a)(1) of the Act by refusing 
to arbitrate the grievances. 
The IELRB first noted that an employer’s refusal to arbitrate a grievance generally 
violates the Act, unless the employer can show either that no contractual 
agreement to arbitrate the particular dispute exists, or that arbitration of the 
grievance would conflict with outside law. The Board further noted that when 
evaluating whether a refusal to arbitrate is an unfair labor practice it will not look 
to the merits of the underlying grievance, but only to the agreement between the 
parties. 
The IELRB concluded that a contractual agreement to arbitrate the grievances did 
exist and that the issues presented in the grievances presumptively fell within the 
scope of the collective bargaining agreement. The Board found a strong 
presumption in favor of arbitrability in Illinois and federal precedent and reasoned 
that parties to an agreement must explicitly exclude any issue that they wish to 
exclude from arbitration. 
The Board stated that no such type of exclusionary language existed in the 
agreement at issue. To the contrary, the Board remarked that the contract language 
relating to grievance procedure was very broad. 
The Board distinguished the relevant contract language from the grievance 
provision at issue in Cobden Unit School District No. 17 v. IELRB, 966 N.E.2d 503 
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2012). In Cobden, the court determined that certain portions of 
a grievance were not covered by the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore 
not subject to arbitration. However, according to the Board, the language of the 
grievance provision at issue in Cobden was much narrower in scope than that in 
the present case. In Cobden, a grievance was defined as “any claim by an employee 
or the Association that there has been a violation of the terms of this Agreement.” 
In sharp contrast to the Cobden grievance procedure language, of the collective 
bargaining agreement at issue stated in relevant part: 
A grievance is a complaint involving a work situation; a complaint that there has been a 
deviation from, misinterpretation of or misapplication of a practice or policy; or a 
complaint that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any 
provisions of this Agreement. 




Noting that the collective bargaining agreement stated that a matter is arbitrable 
as long as it involves a work situation, and the fact that tangential issues as to the 
content of certain of the grievants’ personnel files were also contained in the 
union’s grievances, the IELRB held that the grievances at issue were not 
contractually precluded from arbitration. 
The Board next addressed the employer’s second defense, that Section 4 of the 
IELRA, regarding management rights, precluded arbitration of the grievances. 
Section 4 of the Act states, inter alia: “Employers shall not be required to bargain 
over matters inherent in managerial policy, which shall include such areas of 
discretion or policy as the … selection of new employees …” The employer argued 
that the analysis used to determine whether a matter is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, should apply to the present case. The IELRB found the law of scope of 
bargaining inapplicable to issues of arbitrability. 
The Board further distinguished the present case from Cobden, illustrating that 
there would be no conflict with outside law should the employer submit to 
arbitration. In Cobden, certain statutory language divested an arbitrator of 
authority to consider the conduct at issue in the grievance. The Board reasoned 
that no such conflict existed in the instant case, and held that Section 4 of the Act 
did not preclude arbitration of the union’s grievances. 
B.  Majority Interest Petitions 
In Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and 
AFSCME, Local 698, 29 PERI ¶ 67 (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that fraud in the 
execution of a representation authorization card that is clear on its face requires a 
showing of deception through which the party is denied a full opportunity to read 
the document.  In this decision, the IELRB held there was no fraud when it found 
no clear and convincing evidence that employees were denied the opportunity to 
read the authorization cards. 
On March 23, 2012, the union filed a majority interest petition seeking to represent 
employees serving the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in several 
classifications of veterinary technicians.  The university objected to the petition, 
claiming that the authorization cards were obtained through fraud because union 
officials allegedly informed bargaining unit members that the authorization cards 
served as requests for additional information about the union. The university 
submitted affidavits from three employees that stated that the union organizers 
told them that the purpose of signing the cards was simply to obtain more 
information about the union. 
 WINTER 2013 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 29 
      
The authorization cards stated the following: 
I hereby designate the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
Council 31, AFL-CIO, as my exclusive bargaining representative. I understand that when 
a majority of my co-workers join me by signing a card, this card can be used to win 
AFSCME Council 31 representation for me and my coworkers by obtaining certification 
as our exclusive bargaining representative without an election. 
The IELRB majority noted that the language was clear and found no evidence that 
employees were fraudulently induced to sign the cards.  The IELRB noted that 
Section 7(c-5) of the IELRA requires “clear and convincing” evidence to prove 
fraud and that “clear and convincing” evidence has been defined as “the quantum 
of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the 
truth of the proposition in question…more than a preponderance while not quite 
approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal 
offense.”  Because the language was clear, the IELRB found that there was not clear 
and convincing evidence that employees were fraudulently induced to sign the 
cards. 
Moreover, the IELRB reasoned that the employees should have been aware of what 
the cards said and that Illinois courts have stated that: 
[o]ne is under a duty to learn, or know, the contents of a written contract before he signs 
it, and is under a duty to determine the obligations which he undertakes by the execution 
of a written agreement. And the law is that a party who signs an instrument relying upon 
representations as to its contents when he has had an opportunity to ascertain the truth 
by reading the instrument and has not availed himself of the opportunity, cannot be heard 
to said that he was deceived by the misrepresentation. 
The IELRB further noted that fraud involves some deception through which a party 
is denied a full opportunity to read the document.  The IELRB further observed 
that the party must not have been able to discover the truth through a reasonable 
inquiry, or must have been prevented from making a reasonable inquiry.  However, 
in this case, the IELRB found no evidence that the employees were denied a full 
opportunity to read the cards or that the truth was fraudulently concealed.  Thus, 
the IELRB held that, regardless of whether the employees who gave the affidavits 
read the authorization cards before signing them, the university did not present 
clear and convincing evidence that the authorization cards were obtained through 
fraud. 
The IELRB also noted that the Illinois Supreme Court, in County of DuPage v. 
ILRB, 231 Ill.2d 593, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008), stated that the majority interest 
process in the IELRA was based on the New York statute.  In that case, the supreme 




court presumed that the Illinois legislature was aware of the rules adopted by the 
New York Board, and that the Illinois legislature intended similar results. The 
IELRB presumed the same.  Consequently, the IELRB found another avenue by 
which to affirm the Executive Director’s dismissal of the university’s fraud-based 
objection when it noted that the New York Board has found the probative value of 
affidavits to be relatively weak in comparison to explicit language on cards.  Thus, 
the IELRB affirmed the Executive Director’s dismissal of the university’s objection 
to the majority interest petition based on the union’s alleged fraud in obtaining the 
authorization cards. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Confidential Employees 
In Department of Central Management Services/Department of State Police v. 
ILRB, 980 N.E.2d 1259, (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2012) the Fourth District Appellate 
Court held that an attorney for the State Police qualified as a confidential employee 
under the authorized access test, vacating, in part, the ILRB State Panel’s 
certification of representation including the attorney in a stand-alone bargaining 
unit. The ILRB State Panel had ruled that the attorney position in question was not 
subject to either the Act’s managerial or confidential exclusions. The Appellate 
Court agreed with the ILRB that the attorney position did not meet the 
requirements of the managerial exclusion, but found the attorney qualified as a 
confidential employee based on the position’s job responsibilities even though he 
had never actually worked on any matter involving labor relations or accessed any 
materials relating to collective bargaining. 
On October 26, 2009 the Illinois State Employees Association, Laborers 
International Union, Local 2002 filed a representation-certification petition 
seeking to create a collective bargaining unit consisting of four positions classified 
as public service administrator, option 8L, or staff attorney with the State Police 
and Illinois Emergency Management Agency. The Department of State Police 
objected to including the public service administrators, option 8L, in the 
bargaining unit. 
In October 2010 an ALJ issued a recommended decision including two of the three 
attorneys, William Jarvis and Nicholas Kondelis, in the bargaining unit based on 
the finding that neither of their positions qualified as confidential or managerial. 
The third attorney was not included based solely on a lack of evidence regarding 
the position. The employer filed exceptions to the ALJ’s recommended decision. 
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The State Panel upheld the ALJ’s determination that Jarvis was not a confidential 
employee and excluded him from the bargaining unit.  As for Kondelis, the State 
Panel agreed he did not qualify for either exclusion and certified the bargaining 
unit including him. The employer appealed. 
The court uphelded the ILRB’s determination that Konelis did not qualify as a 
managerial employee. Section 3(j) of the IPLRA defines “managerial employee” as 
“an individual who is engaged predominantly in executive and management 
functions and is charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of 
management policies and practices.” The ILRB had concluded that Kondelis’ 
primary duties of assisting in merit-board cases and advising personnel in the 
Department’s forensic science laboratories did not make him a managerial 
employee. 
The court distinguished Salaried Employees of North America (SENA) v. ILRB, 
202 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1022, 560 N.E.2d 926, 933 (1990). Unlike the department 
in SENA that functioned as a single cohesive unit with no formal distinction 
between management and the union employees, the employer’s legal office had a 
“clear hierarchy and division of labor.” Although Kondelis worked on merit-board 
cases he could not accept or reject settlement offers, lacked authority to file a 
complaint, and the only union members involved in hearings he participated in 
belonged to unions other than the Illinois State Employees Association. 
The court next examined the ILRB’s finding that Kondelis did not qualify as a 
confidential employee. The IPLRA defines “confidential employee” as “an 
employee who, in the regular course of his or her duties, assists and acts in a 
confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate 
management policies with regard to labor relations or who, in the regular course 
of his or her duties, has authorized access to information relating to the 
effectuation or review of the employer’s collective bargaining policies.” 
Under the authorized access test, an employee is considered confidential if he or 
she is authorized to access information concerning matters specifically related to 
the collective bargaining process. Information related to collective bargaining 
includes: (1) the employer’s strategy in dealing with an organizational campaign, 
(2) actual collective-bargaining proposals, and (3) the information relating to 
matters dealing with contract administration. City of Evanston v. ILRB, 227 Ill. 
App. 3d 955, 978, 592 N.E.2d 415, 430 (1st Dist. 1992). An employee’s access to 
confidential information relating to “the general workings of the department or to 
personnel or statistical information upon which an employer’s labor relations 




policy is based is insufficient to confer confidential status.” The employee must 
have access to this information in the regular course of his or her duties. 
The ALJ had found that Kondelis did not have to access to “conservations, 
documents, meetings, or any other communications concerning to labor relations.” 
Further, the ALJ determined that since Kondelis’ job duties did not relate to 
collective bargaining, contract matters, or contract administration, he did not 
regularly handle or have access to information that had the potential to provide 
advance notice to the bargaining unit on labor-relations matters. Based on these 
findings, the ALJ determined Kondelis did not qualify as a confidential employee. 
The court noted that both the ALJ and the ILRB analyzed the Kondelis’ position 
based only on the work he previously had performed and did not look more broadly 
to all of his job responsibilities. Before examining Kondelis’ job responsibilities, 
the court acknowledged precedent out of the First District Appellate Court 
addressing the risk, and courts’ general preference, not to look at possible future 
job responsibilities in determining whether an employee qualifies as 
confidential. One Equal Voice v. IELRB, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 777 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 
App. 1st Dist. 2002).  The rationale for this approach stems from concerns that 
employers will use anticipated duties as a way to exclude employees from 
bargaining units. 
Although acknowledging the concerns raised by One Equal Voice, the court 
determined that the facts of this case were distinguishable because Kondelis’ job 
responsibilities were not speculative. The court found that Kondelis qualified as a 
confidential employee, because the State Police’s legal office already had the 
responsibility of providing advice to the labor-relations division, there was 
evidence that attorneys in the office actually work on matters related to collective 
bargaining, and the Chief Counsel for the legal department testified that any type 
of work can potentially be assigned to any employee in the department. 
Based on this evidence, the court held that part of the public administrator option 
8L’s job responsibilities included providing advice to the labor relations division 
and, therefore, these employees had authorized access to information concerning 
the collective-bargaining process between labor and management. That Kondelis 
never had any such assignment did not matter because this work could be assigned 
to him or any other attorney in the position. The court held that when applying the 
authorized-access test, it is necessary to consider “the position’s job 
responsibilities and not just what the current position holder just happens to have 
done so far in the position.” The court reasoned that only looking at the work 
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completed by the employee, and not including the work that could be done based 
on a given position’s responsibilities, would too easily lead to absurd results. 
B.  Managerial Employees 
In Department of Central Management Services/Pollution Control Board v. 
ILRB., 2013 IL App (4th) 110877, 194 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3041 (Ill.App. 4th Dist. 
2013), the Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB State Panel’s ruling 
that attorney-assistants employed by the Pollution Control Board (PCB) were not 
managerial employees under the IPLRA. The court held that the attorney-
assistants were managerial employees as a matter of law due to “their unique 
duties and independent authority as surrogates to the PCB members.” 
The events giving rise to this case began in February 2010, when the American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employee (AFSCME) filed a majority 
interest representation petition with ILRB. AFSCME was seeking to include the 
attorney-assistants of the PCB into an existing bargaining unit. 
The PCB is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative organization that implements 
environmental regulations, drafts and issues environmental regulations, and 
governs the actions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. It is made up 
of five full-time members, each of which is allowed to hire an assistant. These 
assistants have traditionally been attorneys. These attorney-assistants assist the 
full-time members of the PCB by offering advice regarding the legal matters 
affecting the PCB. In addition, the duties of the attorney-assistants included 
drafting and issuing administrative adjudicatory decisions. The court considered 
these duties to be very similar to that of a judicial law clerk and that the attorney-
assistants and the board members they worked with shared “a unity of professional 
interests.” 
The court examined two previous Fourth District decisions concerning whether 
ALJs were considered managerial in order to compare ALJs’ qualities to those of 
the attorney-assistants. In Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs./Ill. Human Rights Comm’n 
v. lLRB, State Panel, 406 Ill.App.3d 310, 943 N.E.2d 1150 (4th Dist. 2010), the 
court found that Human Rights Commission ALJs were managers as a matter of 
law, since the ALJs had the authority to essentially act on behalf of the Human 
Rights Commission. In Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs./Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. 
ILRB., 406 Ill.App.3d 766, 943 N.E.2d 1136 (4th Dist. 2010), the court did not 
conclude that Commerce Commission ALJs were managers as a matter of law, 
because the ALJs did not become “surrogates” of the Commerce Commission. 
Using these two previous decisions as a backdrop, the court determined that 
because the attorney-assistants had independent authority and acted as 




“surrogates” of the PCB, much like the Human Rights Commission ALJs, the 
attorney-assistants were mangers as a matter of law. 
In sum, the Fourth District held that assistants or attorneys of a governmental 
board that has quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority will be considered 
managers as a matter of law if they act as “surrogates” of the governmental 
board  or share “a unity of professional interests” with the governmental board. 
III.  NLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Charter Schools 
In Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School, Inc and Alliance of 
Charter Teachers & Staff, IFT, AFT, 359 NLRB No. 41 (NLRB 2012), the National 
Labor Relations Board found that a private, nonprofit corporation that established 
and operates a public charter school in Illinois is not a political subdivision of the 
State of Illinois but, rather, is an “employer” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, subjecting the corporation to the NLRB’s 
jurisdiction.  The Board made clear that it was not establishing a bright-line rule 
that it had jurisdiction over entities that operate charter schools, wherever they are 
located, but instead its decision was specific to the operation of public charter 
schools under the particular provisions of Illinois law. 
On June 23, 2010, Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers & Staff, IFT, AFT filed a 
majority interest petition with the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board 
seeking to represent teachers employed by CMSA.  On July 29, 2010, CMSA filed 
a representation petition with the NLRB.  On September 20, 2010, the Acting 
Regional Director for Region 13 dismissed CMSA’s petition.  On January 10, 2011, 
the Board granted review. 
The NLRB noted that Illinois Charter Schools Law provides the framework for 
establishment and operation of charter schools in Illinois.  Generally, the Charter 
Schools Law permits local public school boards to contract with third parties to 
provide educational services to children who typically are served by local public 
schools.  A charter school is responsible for the management and operation of its 
own financial affairs, and its board of directors is ultimately responsible for 
governing the school and upholding the charter agreement.  The charter 
agreement provides that the local school board may withhold funds if the charter 
school violates the terms of its charter. 
CMSA is a private, nonprofit corporation that was established in 2003, by five 
individuals, under the Illinois General Not-for-Profit Corporation Act of 1986 for 
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the purpose of operating a charter school.  CMSA’s board of directors conducts 
CMSA’s affairs.  No government entity has the authority to appoint or remove a 
CMSA board member, and no member of the board of directors is a government 
official or works for a government entity. 
Upon its incorporation, CMSA successfully submitted a proposal to the Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago (Chicago Board) to obtain a charter agreement to 
establish a charter school.  This charter agreement expressly acknowledges that 
CMSA is not operating as an agent of the Chicago Board and that the charter may 
be revoked by the Chicago Board for a material violation of any its terms. 
CMSA receives about 80 percent of its budget to operate the school from the 
Chicago Board, with the remainder coming from Federal and State sources.  CMSA 
is required to submit a proposed budget to the Chicago Board but the Chicago 
Board merely reviews the budget and has never rejected CMSA’s budget 
proposals.  Ultimately, CMSA’s board of directors approves CMSA’s budget. 
The NLRB noted that Section 2(2) of the NLRA provides that the term “employer” 
shall not include any state or political subdivision thereof, but acknowledged that 
“political subdivision” is not defined in the NLRA.  The Board further noted that 
the case was governed by the Board’s longstanding test as examined by the 
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600 
(1971).  Under that test, an entity may be considered a political subdivision if it is 
either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute a department or 
administrative arm of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are 
responsible to public officials or the general electorate.  In this case, the Acting 
Regional Director for Region 13 found that the school was a political subdivision 
under both prongs of Hawkins County.  However, the NLRB noted that it has 
previously held that the language of Section 2(2) “exempts only government 
entities or wholly owned government corporations from its coverage — not private 
entities acting as contractors for government.”  Applying this precedent the NLRB 
found that CMSA is not a political subdivision of the State of Illinois under either 
prong of the Hawkins County test. 
The NLRB found that CMSA failed the first prong of the Hawkins County test 
because it was created by private individuals and not by a government entity, 
special legislative act, or public official.  The Board noted that there is no Illinois 
statute, including the Charter Schools Law, that directs that charter schools be 
created.  Rather, CMSA was the result of private individuals and the separate 
authority of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Act.  The Board further noted that it 
has consistently held that entities created by private individuals as nonprofit 




corporations are not exempt under the first prong of Hawkins County and that an 
entity is not exempt simply because it receives public funding or operates pursuant 
to a contract with a governmental entity. 
The NLRB found that CMSA failed the second prong of the Hawkins County test 
because it is not administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials 
or the general electorate.  The Board found it dispositive that none of CMSA’s 
governing board members are appointed by, or subject to removal by, any public 
official.  The Board noted that in determining whether an entity is administered by 
individuals who are responsible to public officials, the “relevant inquiry” is whether 
a majority of the individuals who administer the entity—the governing board and 
executive officers—are appointed by and subject to removal by public officials.  The 
Board noted that an entity will be subject to the Board’s jurisdiction when the 
appointment and removal of a majority of an entity’s governing board members is 
controlled by private individuals—as opposed to public officials.  Applying these 
principles, the Board found that none of CMSA’s board members are responsible 
to public officials and, therefore, CMSA is not “administered” by individuals who 
are responsible to public officials or the general electorate. 
The NLRB found that CMSA, not being a political subdivision of the State of Illinois 
under Hawkins County, is an “employer” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the 
Act.  The Board noted that there was no dispute that CMSA controlled most, if not 
all, matters relating to the employment relationship involving the petitioned-for 
teachers.  Thus, similar to other cases involving government contractors, the Board 
found that CMSA was an “employer” within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, 
meaning that the Board had jurisdiction over CMSA. 
